The ascription of an unconscious intentional phenomenon to a system implies that the phenomenon is in principle accessible to consciousness.
The problem posed by indirect speech acts is the problem of how it is possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else.
Where questions of style and exposition are concerned I try to follow a simple maxim: if you can't say it clearly you don't understand it yourself.
An utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is derived.
The Intentionality of the mind not only creates the possibility of meaning, but limits its forms.
The assertion fallacy ... is the fallacy of confusing the conditions for the performance of the speech act of assertion with the analysis of the meaning of particular words occurring in certain assertions.
Well, what does "good" mean anyway...? As Wittgenstein suggested, "good," like "game," has a family of meanings. Prominent among them is this one: "meets the criteria or standards of assessment or evaluation."
Whatever is referred to must exist. Let us call this the axiom of existence.
Where conscious subjectivity is concerned, there is no distinction between the observation and the thing observed.